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ABSTRACT. In this paper, the relevance of some debt ratio 
determinants from the recent heory of finance is empirically 
investigated in a small business ector. The data used in this 
study consist of average financial data of 27 shoptypes in 20 
different years, covering a period of 24 years. The panel 
character of the data facilitates the use of analytical tech- 
niques aimed at reducing or avoiding the biasing effect of 
omitted variables on the outcomes. The main conclusion is, 
that the theoretical determinants appear indeed to be relevant 
for the small business sector investigated here, but the 
influences encountered in the analyses are far less straight- 
forward than the hypothesized effects in the theory. Influ- 
ences on total debt are frequently found to be the net effects 
of opposite influences on long and short term debt and some 
variables show large time and industry specific effects. 
Further, distinct patterns in the time specific effects were 
found. 
I. Introduction 
The capital structure of the firm has been a 
contentious i sue in the theory of business finance 
since the publication of Modigliani and Miller's 
(1958, 1963) seminal papers. Their initial conclu- 
sions of capital structure irrelevance and, subse- 
quently, of optimal capital structure at a 100% 
debt financing are clearly incompatible with 
observed capital structures, so their findings 
initiated a considerable r search effort to identify 
costs of debt financing that would offset the 
corporate tax advantage. Since then, extensions of 
the Modigliani-Miller theory have been provided 
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by, among others, Robichek and Myers (1965), 
Jensen and Meckling (1976), Ross (1977), Leland 
and Pyle (1977) and Myers (1977). The general 
result of these extensions i that the combination 
of leverage related costs (such as bankruptcy and 
agency costs) and a tax advantage of debt pro- 
duces an optimal capital structure at less than a 
100% debt financing, as the tax advantage is 
traded off against he likelihood of incurring the 
costs. 
This theoretical result is now widely accepted in
the profession. The main criticism is of empirical 
nature, i.e. whether or not the various leverage 
related costs and benefits are economically signifi- 
cant enough to have an appreciable impact on 
optimal leverage. This criticism gave rise to a 
number of empirical studies in which either the 
magnitude of leverage related costs and benefits is 
directly estimated (e.g. Warner, 1977) or in which 
observed capital structures are related to operat- 
ing characteristics which are assumed to reflect 
these costs and benefits (e.g. Scott, 1972, Rem- 
mers et al. 1974, Scott and Martin, 1975, Ferri 
and Jones, 1979, Flath and Knoeber, 1980, 
Castanias, 1983, Bradley et al. 1984). Most of 
these studies use data of firms that would be 
classified as large by any definition of small busi- 
ness. 
The empirical implications of the theory of 
finance for small business are seldom discussed 
(McConnell and Pettit, 1984, and Van der Wijst, 
1989, are exceptions) and even less frequently em- 
pirically tested in a quantitative manner (Keasey 
and McGuinness, 1990, is a noteworthy example). 
This means that there is a large discrepancy 
between the importance of small business in most 
western economies and the attention devoted to it 
by the finance profession. Financial research in the 
field of small business is usually confined to 
descriptive analyses using either case studies (e.g. 
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9 1993 KluwerAcademic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands. 
56 Nico van der Wifst and Roy Thurik 
Rapoport, 1990) or a behavioural approach 
(Norton, 1990) or qualitative analyses (Walker, 
1989). 
In this paper, the relevance of some debt ratio 
determinants from the recent heory of finance is 
empirically investigated in a small business ector. 
These determinants usually refer to factors that 
can not or not adequately be measured by outside 
researchers. Consequently, proxy variables have 
to be used in any empirical investigation and this 
study is no exception. Although the theoretical 
assumptions of completeness and perfectness may 
be less valid for the small firm's capital market 
than they are for the large firm's, no attempts are 
made to capture the effects, if any, of the alleged 
imperfections of the small firm's capital market in 
testing our hypotheses. Also, the determinants are 
tested as such, i.e. we are not considering the joint 
determinants of the investment and the financing 
decision. Hence, this paper is aimed at a rather 
straightforward test of the relevance of theoretical 
determinants. Such tests are scarce in small busi- 
ness, perhaps because mpirical analyses of finan- 
cial structure in small business are frequently 
hampered by a lack of available data. For the 
majority of small firms, publication of the annual 
report is not mandatory and, hence, simply not 
done. This means that laborious fieldwork or 
questionnaires have to be used to collect small 
firm financial statements and this, in turn, means 
that data collection is usually restricted to some 
key figures on financial structure without much 
room for explanatory variables. As a consequence, 
in empirical analyses important determinants of 
financial structure often have to be approximated 
in a rather arbitrary manner or, even worse, simply 
have to be omitted. This may, of course, bias the 
results of the analyses. The analytical technique 
used here reduces or avoids the omitted variables 
bias. The panel character of the data, which 
consist of the average financial statements of 27 
industries in retailing (shoptypes) in 20 years, 
permits the use of this technique. 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, 
the theoretical determinants of financial structure 
are briefly summarized. The data used in this 
study are described in section 3 and section 4 
contains the empirical analysis, i.e. the empirical 
proxy variables, the model specifications and the 
estimation results. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
2. Debt ratio determinants 
From the combined theoretical and empirical 
studies of business finance, that have been pub- 
lished over the past three decades, some broad 
categories of debt ratio determinants can be seen 
to emerge. These determinants make no explicit 
distinction between small and large business ~and 
they refer, of course, to the costs and benefits 
associated with financial contracting. In the ab- 
sence of costs and benefits, i.e. in the perfect 
capital markets for which financial economists 
have such a pronounced bias, the market value of 
the firm is independent of its capital structure, as 
the famous Modigliani-Miller irrelevance theorem 
demonstrates. The market imperfections that have 
been brought forward as determinants ofthe firm's 
optimal capital structure can be collocated in the 
categories taxes, bankruptcy costs, agency costs 
and signalling effect} 
The influence of taxes on financial structure 
rests on differences in fiscal treatment between 
debt and equity: since interest payments are tax 
deductible and dividends are not, the fiscal regime 
is generally considered to favour debt. This simple 
tax effect can be complicated by several factors. 
First of all, non-debt tax shields, such as deprecia- 
tion charges and investment ax credits, can 
reduce the expected tax benefit from interest 
payments. Secondly, personal taxes can offset the 
favourable treatment of debt at the corporate 
level, as Miller (1977) pointed out. Thirdly, 
aspects of the tax regime can create differences in 
investors' preferences. For instance, in many 
countries the tax rates applying to capital gains are 
lower than those applying to dividend and interest 
income. This creates a preference for capital gains 
over dividends from stock ownership, but other 
aspects can cancel out this effect. Some investors 
are not taxed, e.g. pension funds or very small 
investors, who benefit from the fact that small 
amounts of dividend are usually exempt from 
taxation. Other investors, such as retired people, 
may depend on dividend income for their liveli- 
hood# Given the wide variety among investors' tax 
situations, the combined effect of all these aspects 
of the fiscal environment can become quite com- 
plex. Therefore, it is usually assumed that the net 
effect of all fiscal rules creates, over a certain 
range, a positive ta'. incentive for corporate debt 
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financing, albeit that this effect is smaller than in 
the original Modigliani-Miller theory and that it 
may not apply equally to all investors. 
Without some costs to offset he tax advantage, 
this incentive will lead to a maximal use of debt 
financing, which is not observed in practice. The 
first counterbalancing costs to be suggested by, 
among others, Robichek and Myers (1965) and 
Baxter (1967), were the dead-weight losses asso- 
ciated with bankruptcy and reorganization. Bank- 
ruptcy costs refer to the added costs (such as legal 
fees, reduced sales, increased production costs, 
etc.) that arise because the firm cannot meet its 
obligations to creditors without changing its 
operating or external financing activities (Haley 
and Schall, 1979). The theoretical influence of 
bankruptcy costs is not contentious but from an 
empirical point of view the importance is some- 
what controversial. The evidence collected in 
different studies varies from direct bankruptcy 
costs averaging a trivial 1% of the market value of 
the firm prior to bankruptcy to an approximate 
20% of the estate. Most studies agree that some 
direct costs decline with firm size, stressing the 
importance for smaller firms. Substantial indirect 
costs can arise from the imperfection ofsecondary 
markets for physical assets. To illustrate, Kim 
mentions that in a distress ale, assets may bring as 
little as 30% of their wholesale price (Kim, 1978, 
p. 47). All these effects contribute to a reduction 
in firm value if the possibility of "financial distress" 
exists, even if bankruptcy in the legal sense is 
virtually impossible. Hence, increasing the ex- 
pected value of these costs by choosing high debt 
levels which increase the probability of bankruptcy 
will, at a certain point, cancel out the tax advan- 
tage. 
Perhaps the most powerful concept of leverage 
related costs was introduced by Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), who describe the firm as a nexus 
of relationships that can be characterized as 
principal-agent relationships. The firm's security 
holders (debtholders as well as stockholders) can 
be seen as principals and the firm's management as 
the agent, managing the principals' assets. This 
principal-agent relation is costly, because there is a 
possibility that the agent will not always conduct 
business in a way that is consistent with the best 
interest of the principals. Hence, the latter may 
insist on various types of protective covenants and 
monitoring devices in order to protect themselves. 
Monitoring is generally facilitated by using cove- 
nants that restrict the entrepreneur's activity, 4 
thereby increasing financing costs. The costs of 
writing and enforcing these covenants and of 
employing other monitoring devices may well be 
substantial. These costs are likely to be compara- 
tively high for small and young firms, because of 
the lack of formal financial control and the firms' 
flexibility to change its assets. This makes it 
difficult to gain insight into their financial per- 
formance. Monitoring and bonding costs are likely 
to increase with the degree of protection they 
offer. Therefore, security holders will not seek 
perfect protection, but these agency costs, as 
Jensen and Meckling call them, will be traded off 
against the likelihood of a loss resulting from 
management actions. If agency costs also increase 
with the proportion of financing supplied by any 
type of security holder, conformably toJensen and 
Meckling's uggestion, it is possible to argue that a 
capital structure xists in which total agency costs 
are minimal. In this way, an optimal capital struc- 
ture may exist even in the absence of taxes and 
bankruptcy costs. 
Additionally, it can be noted that some, if not 
all, of the firm's financial relationships have 
information value, as is suggested by Ross' (1977) 
signalling hypothesis. The financial obligations a
firm enters into may serve as signals to the public 
about he future performance of the firm. Dividend 
policy is another obvious candidate for a signalling 
device. Still other signals may spring from the 
owner/manager's personal financial involvement 
in the firm, as is suggested by, among others, 
Leland and Pyle (1977). Signalling activities arise 
in situations in which information is unevenly 
distributed over investors and management (i.e. 
when "information asymmetry" exists) and when 
moral hazard hampers the direct transfer of 
information between market participants. Gener- 
ally, the firm's management are most knowledge- 
able of its prospects, but they cannot be expected 
to be entirely straightforward about these pro- 
spects for two reasons. First, there may be 
substantial rewards for exaggerating the firm's 
positive qualities and obscuring the negative ones, 
when ascertaining the true qualities by outside 
parties is costly or impossible. Second, managers 
can be reluctant to disclose the full merit of the 
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firm since this might allow competitors to appro- 
priate key features of the firm's projects. Informa- 
tion asymmetry is particularly pronounced for, 
again small and young firms in a dynamic industry. 
These firms usually must incur high costs to 
generate information for use by outside investors, 
because much of their expertise and knowledge is
intangible and hard to quantify. So, like bank- 
ruptcy and monitoring costs, information costs are 
also likely to be a more important financial struc- 
ture determinant for small businesses than for 
large ones. 
3. Data 
The data used in this study refer to the retail trade 
in the former Western Germany and are publicly 
available: the information has been published by 
the collectors for purposes such as interfirm 
comparisons. The data are based on information 
of individual firms, but the unit of observation 
used here is the published "industry average", i.e. 
the averaged ata for narrowly defined shoptypes 
such as supermarkets and shoe shops. The data 
have a panel character: information on shoptypes 
is available for a number of years. 5 
The data were collected by the "Institut fiir 
Handelsforschung an der Universitiit zu Krln" in 
two separate series of surveys. The first series 
consists of regular inquiries into the financial 
situation of the retail trade, made every alternate 
year over the period 1955 through 1969 and the 
years 1973 and 1977. The balance sheet data for 
this study have been taken from two ten year 
summaries and a periodical, both brought out by 
the research institute mentioned above. 6Because 
beginning and ending balance sheets were col- 
lected, an uninterrupted row of ending balance 
sheets over the period 1954 through 1969 can be 
constructed, as well as ending balance sheets for 
the years 1972, 1973, 1976 and 1977. 
The second series of surveys consists of yearly 
inquiries into the sales, costs, margins and profits 
of the retail trade over the period 1949 through 
1986. In these surveys, information on income 
statements is collected and published for largely 
the same shoptypes as in the balance sheet survey. 
The income statement data for this study have 
been taken from three ten year summaries brought 
out by the Cologne institute mentioned earlier. 7
Both series of surveys are claimed to be represen- 
tative of the German retail trade for all variables 
except size variables (sales size, total assets). From 
the publications, ales size (and sample size) can 
be seen to differ between both surveys, but the 
only ratio they have in common, the inventory 
turnover, correlates almost perfectly between the 
surveys (simple correlation coefficient always 
> 0.94, usually > 0.97). Hence, it seems safe to 
use ratios from the income statement survey in the 
analysis of balance sheet data. The combined 
surveys contain concise balance sheets, income 
statements and information on labour volume, 
shop surface, prices, etc. This information is 
available for 27 shoptypes over the entire period 
and for 15 other shoptypes over a part of the 
period. Only the former 27 shoptypes are used in 
this study. A more detailed escription of the data 
can be found in the publications referred to 
earlier. A list of the 27 shoptypes involved and 
some key financial data per shoptype are ap- 
pended to this paper. In Figure 1 the development 
of some leverage ratios over time (averaged across 
shoptypes) is depicted. Figure 1 shows, that the 
average financial structure in retailing over the 
period is largely stable. The share of equity in total 
assets rises slowly in the fifties, is more or less 
stable in the sixties and slowly diminishes in the 
seventies. Total debt shows, of course, the oppo- 
site picture but the ratio of long term debt to total 
assets slowly increases over almost the entire 
period. Taken as a whole, however, the changes 
occurring in the period of almost a quarter of a 
century are remarkably small. 
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Fig. 1. Leverage ratios over time 
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4. Empirical analyses 
4.1 Variables 
From the data described in the previous ection, 
the following variables are adopted for the empiri- 
cal analyses. The obvious choice of variable to be 
explained is the debt ratio, since all theoretical 
determinants are formulated in terms of more or 
less leverage. Estimating separate relations for 
long and short term debt ratios (long and short 
term debt to total assets) allows for influences on 
the maturity structure of debt as well as on 
leverage. Total assets is included as size variable in 
the explanation of the debt ratios in order to test 
for scale effects in the relation between debt and 
total assets. 
The tax effect on debt has to be incorporated in
an indirect manner, because no direct measures 
are available. Following Bradley et al. (1984), 
depreciation charges are used to indicate non-debt 
tax shields? The ratio of depreciation charges to 
total costs is included in the analyses to indicate 
the tax advantage. Since depreciation charges can 
reduce the expected tax benefits from interest 
payments, this variable is expected to be nega- 
tively related to leverage. 
Two variables pertaining to the firm's assets are 
included to capture the effects of bankruptcy and 
agency costs. Agency costs are, to a large extent, 
made to avoid bankruptcy costs, so a reduction in 
the latter also diminishes the need to incur the 
former. Hence, both determinants are usually 
approximated with the same variables. Bankruptcy 
costs can be thought of as the difference between 
the firm's operating value and its liquidation value, 
so a high liquidation value makes debt financing 
more attractive. Since fixed assets are generally 
considered to offer more security (i.e. a higher 
liquidation value) than current assets, asset struc- 
ture (i.e. the ratio of fixed to total assets) is used to 
indicate the liquidation value.  9 The second vari- 
able to be included, inventory turnover, is not 
frequently encountered in the literature, but in 
retailing inventories are a financially (and com- 
mercially) important part of the assets. The 
characteristics of the inventories determine wheth- 
er or not they are accepted by banks as collateral 
for loans 1~ and this can have a substantial influ- 
ence on financial structure. Inventory turnover is 
likely to reflect the liquidity of, and thus, the 
security offered by the inventories. Both variables 
are expected to have a positive ffect on leverage, 
but they can also influence the maturity structure 
of debt, i.e. a large fixed asset component can be 
associated with a comparatively heavy use of long 
term debt and a high inventory turnover with 
relatively much short erm debt. 
The fifth variable to be included is return on 
investment, which reflects the possibilities to 
retain earnings. The importance of these internally 
generated funds is stressed by Myers (1984) and 
Myers and Majluf (1984), following the observa- 
tion that firms seem to prefer raising capital by 
retaining earnings in the first place, by borrowing 
in the second place and by issuing new equity in 
the last place. An explanation of this "pecking 
order" in financing alternatives, as Myers calls it, 
can be based on the asymmetrical distribution of 
information between potential outside investors 
and the firm's management. When the investors 
are less knowledgeable of the firm's prospects than 
its management, a situation may arise in which 
firms face the dilemma of either passing by 
projects with a positive net present value or issuing 
stock at a price they think is too low. This situation 
can be avoided if a firm can retain enough 
internally generated funds to cover its positive 
NPV opportunities or if it can maintain financial 
slack in the form of "reserve borrowing power". In 
this view, observed debt ratios will reflect the 
cumulative requirement for external financing 
over an extended period, and will be negatively 
related to profitability) I 
4.2 Analyses 
The hypotheses formulated above as a priori 
expectations are tested by including the five 
variables in a Least-Squares Dummy Variable 
(LSDV) regression analysis of the pooled cross 
section and time series data. Autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity areaccounted for in the estima- 
tion procedure. Beforehand, the variables ex- 
pressed as money amounts have been deflated 
with the industry specific price indices included in 
the data, 12 and separate regression equations are 
estimated for long and short term debt. Since the 
analysis concentrates on debt ratios as such (and 
not their changes over time), neither leads and lags 
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nor the simultaneities, if any, in the financing and 
investment decisions are considered. A few re- 
marks may serve to illustrate this research design. 
The LSDV technique is chosen because the five 
variables could very well exhibit important indus- 
try and/or time commonalities and, more seri- 
ously, they can be correlated with industry and 
time specific omitted variables. In the latter case, 
the results of an OLS analysis would partly reflect 
the influence of the omitted variables rather than 
the pure effects of the included variables. By 
introducing shoptype and/or time specific var- 
iables into the regression equation, it is possible to 
reduce or avoid the omitted variable bias (see 
Hsiao, 1986). The panel character of the data 
permits these variables to be included. Time and 
industry specific variables can be included in 
basically two ways. First, since all variables consist 
of observations per shoptype repeated over time, 
they can be averaged across shoptypes per period 
and across periods per shoptype. If these averages 
would be added to the regression equation, they 
would provide insight into the cross-sectional 
(within group) and time series (between group) 
characteristics of the variables themselves. This 
procedure would only capture effects of omitted 
variables in so far as they are related to the 
fluctuations in the shoptype and period averages 
of the included variables. 
The second way to include time and industry 
specific effects is based on the more likely assump- 
tion that the effects of shoptype specific omitted 
variables tay constant hrough time for a given 
shoptype but vary across hoptypes. Similarly, the 
effects time specific omitted variables are likely to 
be the same for all shoptypes, but will vary in time 
without necessarily showing any pattern. A simple 
way to take account of these effects is to use 
variable-intercept models. Given the above as- 
sumptions regarding the effects of omitted var- 
iables, they can be absorbed into the intercept 
term of a regression model as a means to explicitly 
allow for the individual and time heterogeneity 
contained in the pooled cross section and time 
series data (see Hsiao, 1986 or Dielman, 1989). 
Within the variable-intercept models, the shop- 
type and period specific effects can be treated as 
fixed constants (in fixed-effects models) or as 
random variables (in random-effects models). The 
27 shoptypes involved in this study cover a large 
part of total retailing, so they cannot be considered 
a small sample from a much larger population of 
shoptypes. In this situation, the fixed-effects model 
seems more appropriate than its random-effects 
counterpart.~3 Hence, time and industry effects are 
introduced in this study by estimating the coeffi- 
cients of a fixed-effects model using the least- 
squares dummy variable (LSDV) approach. For 
all shoptypes and all but the first period a separate 
dummy variable is included in the regression 
equation, replacing the intercept. Note that these 
dummy variables will not only capture the time 
and industry specific effects of omitted variables, 
but also the time and industry commonalities in
the included variables. 14 
Autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity, which 
are likely to occur in panel data, are accounted for 
by using an estimated generalized least squares 
estimator for the coefficients of the LSDV analy- 
sis. 15 This estimator is obtained by re-running the 
LSDV regression after a transformation of the 
data. The transformation is done separately for 
long and short term debt. The elements of the 
transformation are obtained as follows. First order 
autocorrelation coefficients (p) are estimated ~6for 
the residuals (ui3 of the original LSDV regressions 
(i and t are subscripts for shoptype and time 
resp.). Residuals corrected for autocorrelation 
(u*) are calculated as uTt --- ui, - pu i , -v  17 The 
squares of the corrected residuals are regressed on 
the shoptype dummies: (u*) 2 ---- a2iDumi + ~,. The  
coefficient of this regression, o2~ provides an 
estimate of the shoptype specific variance. Using 
these results, the data (Z) are transformed by: 
Z~t = (Zit - PZ i t -  1) '-- Dri fts The thus transformed 
data are then used to re-estimate he coefficients 
of the LSDV model. 
The results of the LSDV analyses are reported 
on in three different ways. First of all, the esti- 
mated GLS results regarding the non-dummy 
variables are presented inTable I. 
From the coefficients for total assets in Table I 
it can be seen, that no scale effects in the long and 
short term debt ratio are found: both coefficients 
are not significantly different from zero. The 
hypothesis regarding the tax effect is not sup- 
ported: the coefficients of depreciation charges are 
not significantly different from zero and the coeffi- 
cient for short term debt is even positive, contrary 
to the expected influence of non-debt tax shields. 
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TABLE I 
Estimated LSDV regression coefficients (pooled data, corrected ror autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity, standard errors 
between parentheses) 
Total Asset Invent. Depr. ROI R 2 
assets struct, turnov, charg (adj.) 
Short erm debt 0.122" -0.410 0.005 0.542* -0.016 0.959 
(0.098) (0.054) (0.002) (0.276) (0.004) 
Long term debt 0.032* 0.394 -0.004 -0.174* -0.008 0.953 
(0.076) (0.041) (0.001) (0.199) (0.003) 
Note: * means not significantly different from zero at a 5% level of significance. 
As regards the effects of bankruptcy and agency 
costs, Table I shows that a high fixed asset com- 
ponent is associated with more long term debt and 
less short term debt, while the reverse is true for a 
high inventory turnover. Hence, debt categories 
apparently are related to the collateral value of the 
asset categories corresponding to turnover ate, 
i.e. the maturity structure of debt strongly relates 
to the "maturity structure" of assets. These results 
could indicate that rules of thumb, proclaiming 
that the time span of investments and their financ- 
ing should be matched (the "golden balance sheet 
rule" as it is called in The Netherlands), have 
played an important role in the financial behavior 
of small firms over the period. 19 The effect of 
profitability, based on Myers' pecking order argu- 
ment, is supported for both short and long term 
debt: the coefficients for ROI are negative and 
significantly so in both cases. 
Taken as a whole, the determinants considered 
here (except he tax effect) seem indeed to be 
relevant for the shoptypes involved, although they 
appear to influence the maturity structure of debt 
rather than its overall evel. Finally, it is noted that 
the results obtained here are largely equivalent to 
those of earlier analyses of the same data set in 
which less elaborate stimation techniques are 
used (Van der Wijst, 1989, Van der Wijst and 
Thurik, 1990). 
The second way in which the results are 
reported on is presented in Table II, in which a 
"decomposition analyses" is provided. This de- 
composition analysis involves the estimation of an 
OLS regression using the same transformed var- 
iables that were used in the LSDV analysis 
(except, of course, the dummies). The differences 
between the OLS and LSDV estimates pring 
from the dummy variables. These differences can 
be split up (decomposed) into a time specific and 
an industry specific component by regressing the 
time and industry dummies (separately) on the 
same set of explanatory variables that was used in 
the OLS and LSDV analyses. E~ The results of 
these xercises are included in Table II, which also 
contains a set of estimation results regarding total 
debt. Since the corrections for autocorrelation a d 
heteroskedasticity are done separately for long, 
short and total debt, the results do not add up 
vertically, only horizontally. In Table II, the OLS 
results are labelled "total effect' because they 
represent the joint effects of the variables and the 
time and industry specific effects. The latter two 
are removed from the LSDV results which are, 
hence, labelled "pure variable ffect". 
The first column of Table II confirms, that a 
large part of the influences pertain to the maturity 
structure rather than the overall evel of debt: the 
effects on the short and long term debt ratio are 
partly of opposite signs. The on balance results of 
the total debt ratio reflect he large proportion of 
short term debt in total debt. The decomposition 
of these results in the second, third and fourth 
column shows, that in the relations for long and 
short term debt the pure variable effects are 
dominant for most variables, except he insignifi- 
cant size variable (total assets) and depreciation 
charges in the case of long term debt. The industry 
specific effects are usually larger than the time 
specific effects. For total debt, however, the 
industry specific effects are dominant for almost 
all variables, while the pure variable effects are 
largely insignificant because the effects on long 
and short term debt tend to cancel out. The 
composition of the effects of depreciation charges 
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TABLE II 
Decomposition ofregression analyses results 
Pure Industry Time 
Total variable specific specific 
effect effect effect effect 
Short term debt 
intercept 0.405 0.000 0.430 -0.026 
total assets 0.245 0.122" 0.200 -0.077* 
asset struct -0.590 -0.410 -0.100 -0.081 
invent, turnov. 0.009 0.005 0.003 0.001 
depr. charg. 0.615 0.542* 0.333 --0.260* 
ROI --0.030 --0.016 --0.009 --0.005 
Long term debt 
intercept 0.067 0.000 0.066 0.002* 
totalassets 0.198 0.032* -0.057 0.223 
asset struct 0.545 0.394 0.091 0.061 
invent, urnov. -0.003 -0.004 0.001 0.000" 
depr.charg. -0.504 -0.174" -0.119" -0.211 
ROI -0.002* -0.008 0.001" 0.004 
Total debt 
intercept 0.497 0.000 0.516 -0.019* 
total assets 0.502 0.203* 0.193 0.107' 
asset struct -0.132 -0.037* -0.072 -0.022* 
invent, urnov. 0.007 0.002* 0.004 0.001" 
depr. charg. 0.119" 0.172" 0.428 -0.482 
ROI -0.034 --0.025 -0.009 0.000" 
Note: * means not significantly different from zero at a 5% 
level of significance. 
on short term and total debt is particularly com- 
plex, consisting of large, opposite time and indus- 
try specific effects. We have no ready explanation 
for this result. On the other hand, the influence of 
asset structure on long and short term debt is 
comparatively straightforward, consisting almost 
entirely of pure variable ffects with minor indus- 
try and time specific components. Summarizing, it
can be concluded that the two way decomposition 
of the effects on total debt shows the influences on 
leverage to be much more complex than the 
coefficients of the simple test in the lower left hand 
corner of Table II suggest. 
The third way in which results of the LSDV 
regression are reported on is presented in Figure 
2. In this Figure, the coefficients of the 19 time 
dummies, obtained in the analyses of long and 
short term and total debt, are plotted against he 
years to which they refer. Figure 2 shows, that 
there is a distinct pattern in the values of the time 
dummy coefficients for short term and total debt. 
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Fig. 2. Coefficients of time dummies 
An almost monotonous decline of the values over 
the period 1955 through 1967 is followed by a 
similarly characteristic increase over the rest of the 
time span. The largely insignificant ime dummy 
coefficients for long term debt show a much less 
clear development over time. A check on relevant 
macro economic variables (such as interest rates, 
inflation, economic growth, etc.) did not produce a
variable with a corresponding pattern, so there is 
no ready explanation for the observed time struc- 
ture in the values of the time dummies for short 
term and total debt. It should be noted however, 
that although the pattern in the time dummies is 
unmistakable, their contribution to the explana- 
tion of debt categories is limited. So the time 
structure in Figure 2 is a distinct but not a 
dominant factor in the analyses. 
5. Conclusions 
The present analyses of financial structure in a 
German panel of shoptype averages give rise to 
several conclusions. First of all, most of the 
determinants of financial structure presented by 
theory of finance appear indeed to be relevant for 
the small business ector investigated here. Non- 
debt tax shields, approximated by depreciation 
charges, of which no significant influences were 
found, are an exception. Secondly, however, the 
influences encountered in the analyses are far less 
straightforward than the hypothesized effects in 
the theory. Most variables influence the maturity 
structure of debt rather than leverage: the effects 
on long and short term debt tend to cancel out. 
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This makes the influences on total debt not only 
smaller, but also more susceptible to industry and 
time specific effects. Thirdly, time and industry 
specific omitted variables, or commonalities in the 
variables used, also play an important role in the 
analyses of short and long term debt: the influence 
of a variable can consist for 50% or more of time 
and industry specific effects, but the pure variable 
effects are dominant in these analyses. Further, the 
time specific effects in the analyses of short term 
and total debt show a distinct pattern of steady 
decrease until 1967, followed by a steady increase 
over the rest of the period. We have no ready 
explanation for this phenomenon. As a concluding 
remark it can be noted that quantitative t sts of the 
empirical implications of the theory of finance in 
small business are an extensive and promising area 
of research, although it is as yet largely neglected 
in the literature on both finance and small busi- 
ness. 
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No~s 
1 Some costs are reported to decrease with firm size, as is 
explained later on. 
2 This division is adopted from Van der Wijst (1989), which 
contains a more comprehensive discussion of this subject; 
a short discussion of similar purport can be found in 
McConnell and Pettit (1984). 
3 A discussion and empirical evidence regarding this clientele 
effect, as it is called, is provided by, among others, Copeland 
and Weston (1983). 
4 Contract provisions may prohibit a borrower from incur- 
ring additional debt, from paying dividends, from removing 
assets from the business ite, etc. 
s The data do not have a complete panel character: for some 
shoptypes information is available for less years than it is for 
others. 
6 "Die Verm6gens -- und Kapitalsituation des Einzelhandels 
in dem Jahrzehnt 1954 bis 1963" respectively "1964 bis 
1973" published in 1966 respectively 1975 in the series 
"Sonderhefte der Mitteilungen des Instituts fiir Handelsfor- 
schtmg an der Universit/it zu KSln" as Sonderheft 17 respec- 
tively 25 by Westdeutscher Verlag, KSln respectively Verlag 
Otto Schwartz, GSttingen and: "Die VermSgens -- und 
Kapitalsituation des Einzelhandels in den Jahren 1976 und 
1977" in: "Mitteilungen des Instituts fiir Handelsforschung an
der Universit/it zu KSln', Jahrg. 31, no. 4, April 1979. 
7 "Umsatz, Kostern, Spannen und Gewinn des Einzelhandels 
in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in dem Jahrzehnt 1949 
bis 1958" respectively "1959 bis 1968" respectively "1969 
bis 1978" published in 1962 respectively 1970 respectively 
1980 in the series "Sehriften zur Handelsforschung" as Schrift 
no. 22 respectively 44 respectively 63 by the Westdeutscher 
Verlag, KSln, (n. 22 and 44) and Verlag Otto Schwartz, 
GSttingen (no. 63). 
s Bradley et al. include investment ax credits in their 
measure of non-debt ax shields and use R&D expenses as a 
separate indicator of non-debt tax shields; these variables are 
not available in the data at hand. 
9 This variable is also used by, among others, Marsh (1982). 
10 The inventories of shoptypes selling fast moving consumer 
goods (e.g. supermarkets) typically are accepted as collateral 
while the inventories of shoptypes elling goods subject to 
fashion, such as clothes hops, are not. 
11 The share of retained earnings in equity, reflecting the 
possibility to retain earnings over an extended period of time, 
would be a better variable to capture the pecking order effect 
but unfortunately this variable is not available. 
12 Information on prices is not available for all shoptypes; if
information is missing, price indices of adjacent shoptypes or 
of total retailing are used. 
13 See Hsiao (1986) p. 41--47, for a discussion of the pros 
and cons of fixed and random-effects models. 
14 Including e.g. both the slioptype dummies and the averages 
across periods per shoptype would, of course, produce 
perfect multicollinearity. 
~5 See e.g. Judge et al., 1982, chp. 14--15 for a description of 
this technique. 
16 The estimation procedure involves regressing the residuals 
on the residuals one period lagged. 
~7 For the first ycar of observation u.t _ (,[l _ p2)ui, is used. 
is For the first year of observation Z~ - ((~/1 - p2)Zi t  ) - t7 i
is used. 
19 Recent research shows that this rule of thumb still influ- 
ences financial policy in small business; see Van der Wijst 
(1989, p. 93) for a more detailed iscussion and references. 
20 For these analyses it must be assumed that the lime 
dummies are the same for all shoptypes and that the shoptype 
dummies are the same for all periods. See Carree and Thurik 
(1990) where a comparable method is used to estimate the 
influence of entry barriers on retail profit margins. 
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Appendix. Shoptypes and key financial data per shoptype. 
Shoptype CURR EQ TOTAL 
/TA /TA ASSETS SALES 
1 LEBENSMITYELEINZELHND 0.625 0.202 120.57 816.73 
2 TABAKWARENEINZELHND 0.851 0.098 70.30 512.22 
3 TEXTILEINZELHND HERR~NOBERBEKLEIDUNG 0.741 0.089 522.39 1594.60 
4 TEXTILEINZELHND DAM~NOBERBEKLEIDUNG 0.719 0.110 427.37 1553.76 
5. TEXTILEINZELHND HERREN-, DAMEN-BEKL. 0.704 0.082 928.31 2656.20 
6 TEXTILEINZELHND HERRENAUSSTATTUNG 0.758 0.115 223.63 674.88 
7 TEXTILEINZELHND WAESCHE, WIRK-STRICKWAREN 0.779 0.088 234.59 716.34 
8 TEXTILEINZELHND HAUS-UND BETTWAESCHE usw. 0.624 0.106 321.07 938.09 
9 TEXTILEINZELHND MIT GEMISCHTEM SORTIMENT 0.700 0.081 687.61 1762.12 
10 SHUHEINZELHND 0.749 0.092 303.66 770.54 
11 MOEBELEINZELHND 0.675 0.055 1056.10 2610.20 
12 GLAS-, PORZELLAN-UNK KERAMIKEINZELHND 0.728 0.100 337.13 855.03 
13 ELSENWAREN-UND HAUSRAT VORW KUECHENGER. 0.726 0.073 294.14 764.67 
14 ELSENW.-UND HAUSR. VORW BAUBESCHLAEGEN 0.785 0.053 778.05 1953.31 
15 ELSENWAREN-UND HAUSRATHND GEMISCHT SORT. 0.736 0.060 671.63 1619.46 
16 BELEUCHTUNGS-UND ELEKTROEINZELHND 0.711 0.076 471.65 1233.41 
17 RADIO-LrND FERNSEHEINZELHND 0.778 0.092 414.92 1171.57 
18 TAPETEN-UND BODENBELAGHND 0.756 0.082 555.28 1708.31 
19 DROGERIEN 0.703 0.142 130.64 426.45 
20 LEDERWAREN-UND GALANTERIEWARENHND 0.740 0.108 231.63 708.46 
21 PHOTOEINZELHND 0.766 0.147 331.65 1143.48 
22 UHREN-, JUWELEN-, GOLD-, UND SILBERWARENHND 0.821 0.083 389.56 689.57 
23 SPORTARTIKELEINZELHND 0.778 0.095 369.24 1122.13 
24 SORTIMENTSBUCHHND 0.830 0.103 231.28 1034.73 
25 PAPIER-, BUEROBEDARF-UND SCHREIBWARENHND 0.762 0.106 250.87 936.06 
26 BUEROMACHINEN-, BUEROMOEBELHND 0.805 0.079 1066.14 3897.77 
27 BLUMENBINDEREIEN 0.592 0.262 62.20 425.82 
Note: The first column (CURR/TA) contains current assets divided by total assets and the second column (EQ/TA) contains the 
ratio of equity to total assets. The third and fourth column show total assets and sales respectively in 103 DM, current prices. All 
figures refer to data averaged over 20 years of observation. 
